|
Wireville News
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
3M suit targets plant in South Alabama
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DUPONT in the Safety arena for asbestos exposure to workers AGAIN
THEN: Tempers flare as DuPont asbestos trial enters fourth week Thursday, March 06, 2008 By David Yates Tempers began
to flare last week as the possible billion-dollar asbestos trial of Willis
Whisnat Jr. et al vs. DuPont De Nemours wrapped up its third week of
testimony on Friday, March 7. NOW: June 25, 2009 DuPont sued
over asbestos in DuPont Co.
exposed workers in The lawsuits
came from former workers at a Lycra spandex plant in DuPont knew
that exposure to asbestos could harm workers as early as 1964, the complaints
said, but the company continued to use asbestos in the heat pipes and machinery
of its The workers,
Cristian Dematei, Juan Carlos Laborda and Ceferino Ramirez, are represented by
the Dematei, who
worked at the facility for 11 years, suffers from asbestosis, a chronic
condition that causes shortness of breath and an increased risk of lung cancer,
the complaint said. Laborda worked
at the plant from 1968 to 1980, according to his complaint, and suffers from
asbestosis and asbestos-related lung cancer. Ramirez worked
at the facility for 32 years before retiring in 1993. He has been diagnosed
with asbestos-related laryngeal cancer and asbestosis, his lawsuit said. The lawsuits
allege that workers were never warned of the dangers of asbestos exposure or
given respiratory protection. Amanda
Velazquez, asbestos medical paralegal for Jacobs & Crumplar, said:
"They need to break the double standard," referring to DuPont
stopping using asbestos in DuPont
spokesman Dan Turner said, "While we have not had the opportunity to
review the filing yet, and cannot comment on the specifics, we do find it
puzzling that the plaintiff's attorneys have filed the compliant in Velazquez said
it makes sense to sue a company in the place where it is based. Friday,
July 03, 2009 http://reports.ewg.org/reports/asbestos/facts/fact3.php
Section 3: SOMETHING
IN THE AIR:  [Excerpt
| Full
document] Nothing
proves the culpability of the asbestos manufacturers in the death and injury of
asbestos workers quite like internal documents from the companies themselves.
These papers, just a handful of which we present here, prove beyond a shadow of
a doubt that the companies and their insurers knew the hazards of asbestos and
concealed this information from workers for decades. More than any other piece
of evidence, it is the companies' own internal papers that have convinced
juries of citizens across the country that workers and their families deserve
compensation to help them manage the severe and often fatal health consequences
of working with asbestos.
The
current push by defendant industries to establish a national asbestos victims
trust fund is driven in large part by the fact that courts consistently find
asbestos companies guilty, not just of exposing their workers to a substance —
asbestos — that could kill or severely injure them, but of doing this with full
knowledge of the fatal consequences of their actions, and of actively
concealing this truth from these same workers. The
1966 comments of the Director of Purchasing for Bendix Corporation, now a part
of Honeywell, capture the complete disregard of an industry for its workforce
that is expressed over and over again in company documents spanning the past 60
years. "...if you have enjoyed a good life while working with
asbestos products, why not die from it." —
1966 Bendix Corporation letter [view
document] Sweeping
culpability
Proponents
of asbestos tort reform argue that companies that "had nothing to do
with" asbestos manufacturing are being dragged into court unfairly. The
documents presented here, while just a smattering, illuminate the dimensions of
what was clearly, and remains today, a sweeping deception of American workers
across entire sectors of the economy. It
took more than just Johns Manville and W.R. Grace lying to their workers to
produce the ten thousand Americans currently dying each year of asbestos
diseases. It took similar behavior at Exxon, Dow (Union Carbide), DuPont,
Bendix (now Honeywell), The Travelers, Metropolitan Life, Dresser Industries
(now Halliburton), National Gypsum, Owens-Corning, General Electric, Ford, and
General Motors, just to name a few. The list is a roll call of major American
corporations. What they did to their workers, the public, and their communities,
we can only hope will never be repeated. Early
knowledge that asbestos was deadly
Asbestos
diseases have been known and documented for over 100 years. During an autopsy
in 1900, Dr. H. Montague Murray, a physician in
In
1924, the first clear case of death due to asbestosis was published in the
British Medical Journal. Dr. W.E. Cooke, an English physician who gave the
disease its name, reported the results of an autopsy on a thirty-three-year old
woman who had worked in an asbestos textile factory for thirteen years. The
publication led to years of intensive study of asbestosis in In
the By
the 1930s, asbestos manufacturers and their insurance companies knew that
asbestos was killing workers at alarming rates. In 1934, In
October 1935, the Eastern Underwriter reported on the "alarming increase
of asbestos cases" in the So
severe were the hazards of asbestos that by the eve of World War II, asbestos
manufacturing was in decline. The war, however, reversed the fortunes of the
asbestos industry and launched an era of massive use of asbestos in ships that
led to an explosion of asbestos products for the next three decades. The
resulting atrocity has been described and documented in detail by Paul Brodeur,
in Outrageous Misconduct; Barry Castleman, in Asbestos: Medical and
Legal Aspects; and more recently by Michael Bowker, in Fatal Deception,
and Andrew Schneider, in An Air That Kills, with a particular focus on
the W.R. Grace asbestos mine in Libby, Montana. "So
many embarrassing documents"
We
present here a small selection of insurance and manufacturing company documents
made public through litigation. These papers reveal a brazen disregard for the
men and women who, by the 1960s, were dying by the thousands each year for
these businesses, a history of abuse and deception that is unparalleled in
American industrial history. In large measure, it is the written words of these
company executives that have convinced juries across Both
insurers and manufacturers understand the power of these documents. As
litigation by asbestos workers began to heat up in the 1980s, industry officials
recognized the potential significance of the documents being extracted from the
companies by the courts. A 1988 memo written by an asbestos litigation fund
trustee lamented that: "there are so many embarrassing documents that
people disagree as to which group of any ten documents is the worst." [Excerpt
| Full
document] As
the author notes, more documents were certain to become public during
litigation, and the outlook for the companies was bleak: "The documents noted above, however, show corporate
knowledge of the dangers associated with exposure to asbestos dating back to
1934. In addition, the plaintiffs' bar will probably take the position — not
unreasonably — that the documents are evidence of a corporate conspiracy to
prevent asbestos workers from learning that their exposure to asbestos could
kill them. (One employee of Manville, who co-authored a 30-year-old document
which is among the group of documents described above, was told by Manville's
Chief of Litigation to hire his own lawyer after the document came to light
because it was the opinion of the Chief of Litigation that the employee could
be indicted for manslaughter.)" —
Memo from a trustee of the Manville Trust, 1988 Industry-wide
knowledge of the hazards
During
the 1950s and 60s, companies were fully aware of the potentially fatal
consequences of working with asbestos, including its ability to cause cancer,
yet millions of workers were exposed to asbestos on the job with virtually no
health protections. As
early as WWII, ASARCO knew that asbestos permanently damaged the lungs leading
to a progressive disease called asbestosis, which is sometimes fatal. "We
knew very well then that inhalation of excessive asbestos dust over a period of
time could cause asbestosis." [View
document] In a
1949 document, Exxon admitted that asbestos causes lung cancer, silicosis,
fibrosis and erythema. This relatively early admission that asbestos causes
lung cancer foretold literally hundreds of thousands of deaths from asbestos in
subsequent decades, mortality that continues today in the National
Gypsum was quite explicit about asbestos risks. In a 1958 memo, the company
states: "We know that you will never lose sight of the fact
that perhaps the greatest hazard in your plant is with men handling asbestos.
Because just as certain as death and taxes is the fact that if you inhale
asbestos dust you get asbestosis." —
1958 National Gypsum Memo [View
document] But
perhaps the most authoritative account of the dangers of asbestos can be found
in a blistering 1964 report from a medical doctor hired by Philip Carey
Manufacturing, in which the doctor describes in no uncertain terms to the
company's legal department the health hazards of asbestos to the company's
workers and customers. (The doctor was fired soon after the company received
his report.) "There
is an irrefutable association between asbestos and cancer. This association has
been established for cancer of the lung and for mesothelioma. There is
suggestive evidence... for cancer of the stomach, colon and rectum also. There
is substantial evidence that cancer and mesothelioma have developed in
environmentally exposed groups, i.e., due to air pollution for groups living
near asbestos plants and mines. Evidence has been established for cancer
developing among members of the household. Mesotheliomas have developed among
wives, laundering the work clothes of asbestos workers. Substantial evidence
has been presented that slight and intermittent exposures may be sufficient to
produce lung cancer and mesothelioma. There should be no delusion that the
problem will disappear or that the consumer or working population will not
become aware of the problem and the compensation and legal liability
involved." (Bowker, pg. 171) Insurance
companies try to dodge a bullet
By
the 1970s, the insurance industry was deeply concerned about its financial
vulnerability to asbestos claims. In 1980, the American Insurance Association
predicted that there would be between 8,000 and 13,000 claims a year from
asbestos-caused cancer from 1977 through 1995 [View
document]. This estimate did not include anything but pure occupational
exposure to asbestos, even though asbestos was used in several thousand
consumer and industrial products at that time, and exposure to the general
public was not only staggering in size, but also essentially uncontrolled. "Control of asbestos in the community air is impossible
when you consider the contribution from brake linings, abrasion of piping,
house siding or other materials widely handled by the general public." —
1969 The Travelers Insurance Co. memo Companies
facing legal action were growing concerned about the implications of their
extensive asbestos releases into the environment. The potential liability
represented by environmental pollution with asbestos and the release of
asbestos fibers in the home became a subject of grave financial concern within
the industry. "Asbestosis, lung or colon cancer claims whether comp
or liability, from asbestos workers or those working with asbestos materials,
are one thing, but the general public exposure and claim potential is much more
serious." —
1969 The Travelers Insurance Co. memo Even
worse, reductions of these exposures seemed futile: "If indeed there is at least a causal relationship of
asbestos to the cited diseases, which there appears there is, then a most
serious loss potential to the Travelers exists. Even with the engineering
controls we have available, the exposure will continue and the long development
period of the disease suggests past exposures will continue to haunt us. —
1969 The Travelers Insurance Co. memo In
1968, The Travelers Insurance Company concluded that they faced major financial
exposure from deaths due to non-occupational asbestos exposure near asbestos
manufacturing facilities. In particular, the company concluded that it had
"no chance of winning" a case brought by a resident living near the
Johns Manville plant in New Jersey, who died of mesothelioma in June 1967. This
certainty of defeat was no doubt solidified when a Manville attorney informed
the Travelers that: "Confidentially Johns-Manville has been contaminating
the 'Hell' out of both the air and the water for quite some time." —
1969 The Travelers Insurance Co. memo A
1975 insurance industry memo summarized non-workplace exposure as a major risk
facing the industry. Forty percent of housewives and 50 percent of blue-collar
workers had identifiable asbestos fibers in their lungs at death. The author
concluded that, "It is now found (that) the public in general is or has
been exposed to asbestos products to a far greater degree than previously
recognized." [Source: Insurance industry memo 10/09/75] At
the same time, the hazards of asbestos to family members were well known, and
nothing was being done about it. Workers were taking home huge amounts of
asbestos dust on their clothes, contaminating their homes and exposing their
wives who regularly, and unsuspectingly, handled and washed the dust-laden
garments. A
1974 memo from Exxon declares: "Not only are we violating the existing regulations
concerning clothing by not providing such clothing and laundering it, but we
are also failing to protect our employees and the families of our employees
from asbestos exposure." —
1974 Exxon memo [View
document] On
June 18, 1975, The Travelers Insurance Company's Catastrophe Products Committee
laid out "facts" well known to the asbestos industry and its insurers
at the time: "1) Asbestos causes cancer. Once asbestos fibers are
ingested by a person, in no matter how small a quantity, they remain in the
body and can be the cause of cancer 10 or 20 years later. There is no known way
of removing the fibers from the body. —
1975 The Travelers Insurance Co. memo [View
document] Asbestos
was clearly a potential catastrophe in the making for the industry. An
Insurance Company of North America (INA) memo from the time predicts at least
$20 billion dollars in payouts for asbestos-caused cancers alone. This figure
assumes just $10,000 per case, a relatively low figure for asbestos cancers,
which are almost always fatal. It does not include any deaths from
non-occupational exposure. "The attached article is an estimate of the possible
numbers (plaintiffs) of Asbestos workers who will die from cancer in the next
half century. —
Undated INA memo [View
document] The
goal of The Travelers' "Catastrophe Products Committee" was to study
the potential for asbestos to wipe out the company's assets, and then, in the
company's own words, "make the catastrophe reducible to a level which
would not imperil the assets of The Travelers." [View
document] The
question was how to do it. The decision, on the part of insurers, was to adopt
the same strategy as producers: deny prior knowledge and admit no liability. In
1977, the insurance industry's "discussion group on asbestosis"
unanimously decided not to admit liability in asbestosis cases. The strategies
considered by the insurance companies are also laid out in the minutes of the
meeting, including the "possible use of governmental immunity as a
defense" in an effort to place the blame on the government for not warning
workers of the dangers of working with asbestos. "The meeting closed with a unanimous rejection of a
suggestion that liability in asbestosis cases be admitted..." —
1977 "discussion group on asbestosis" memo [View
document] The
cover up
"KEEP
THIS INFORMATION MOST CONFIDENTIAL" By
the late 1940s, asbestos manufacturers, industries that used significant amounts
of asbestos in their operations, and their insurance companies all acknowledged
internally that asbestos caused lung cancer, asbestosis and mesothelioma.
Rather than adopt safety standards, switch to safer products, or provide
protections for workers, these companies went to extraordinary lengths to
conceal the truth about asbestos from workers, the public and the press. In
some cases company officials went so far as to monitor the health of workers
while deliberately withholding the results of this monitoring from them.
Typically, however, worker health was not actively monitored, but decisive
information on the dangers of asbestos was held secret. In other cases,
companies interfered with and even rewrote scientific study results, restricted
key information on asbestos hazards to management while keeping it from
workers, and deliberately failed to label, or altered labels on, products. A
1949 Exxon document described above illustrates the point. The document lists
the diseases from asbestos exposure as "Silicosis, Fiberosis, Erythema
& Cancer of Lungs" under the banner "COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL: Not
For Publication In Present Form." [View
document] Asbestos
diseases are latent, taking decades to appear after initial exposure. This
latency period allowed companies to use workers for decades, knowing they were
being injured or perhaps even killed by their work, yet also knowing that the
men and women on the job would have no early warning that they might die from
the asbestos they were exposed to. For
companies like Exxon, DuPont, and Dow that were sufficiently removed from basic
asbestos manufacturing, withholding this information was relatively simple —
workers would not ordinarily think of asbestos risks — and concealing
information was a very effective way to reduce compensation payouts. As
put in a memo from Johns-Manville's medical director to corporate headquarters:
"The
fibrosis of this disease is irreversible and permanent so that eventually
compensation will be paid to each of these men. But, as long as the man is not
disabled it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can
live and work in peace and the company can benefit by his many years of experience."
(Brodeur, pg. 102) By
the early 1960s, the hazards of asbestos were well known within the management
level of most companies that dealt with it. Workers and customers, in contrast,
were generally kept in the dark or even lied to. A significant part of the
asbestos industry, represented by the member companies of the Asbestos Textile
Institute, described their management-only information strategy this way: "...this subject should not be brought to the attention
of other than management of our several companies, as any general discussion on
this situation by sales personnel with users of our products, could possibly
aggravate the situation and result in individual opinions which could be
damaging." [Source:
Asbestos Textile Institute memo 11/6/64] Even
work histories on deceased employees were deemed top secret
In
1966, DuPont hoped a company doctor examining an "expired" worker's
history of asbestos exposure would keep a lid on the information he was asked
to produce for the company: "We have on record that [blacked out name] a 36 year
old employee of your plant expired sometime in 1964 from mesothelioma of the
pleura. — 1966
DuPont internal memo [View
document] Keeping
employees in the dark meant leaving no stone unturned, even if it meant putting
pressure on outside physicians. In November, 1980, DuPont sent a letter to a
doctor asking him to remove the word asbestos from a rubber stamp used to mark
X-rays which show changes in lung tissue, perhaps due to asbestos exposures.
DuPont requested that the language of the stamp, which read "could be due
to previous exposure to asbestos or other irritant materials" be changed
to "could be due to previous exposure to irritant materials."[View
document] For
at least 50 years, from the 1930s through the 1980s the unswerving goal of
asbestos users and makers was to keep from workers the undisputed fact that
asbestos was a major threat to their health. An internal memo from a W.R. Grace
executive summed up the strategy quite clearly: "The point I am trying to get across is that our
present policy is to tell no one anything, no visitors, or discussion of our
operations, period." —
1972 W.R. Grace internal memo [View
document] Manipulating
science
Objective
science was a big problem for the industry because it repeatedly showed how
extraordinarily dangerous asbestos really was. In response, the industry
manipulated results and eviscerated papers in largely successful efforts to
bury or obscure results that might damage the bottom line. Some companies
simply stopped conducting studies at all, knowing what the results would be and
fearing that the public might find out. A
1948 memo from a "A meeting of the representatives of the underwriting
companies was held in —
1948 NYU College of Medicine memo [View
document] In
November 1948, a year after receiving promising results that their Kaylo
asbestos product hadn't produced negative health effects in experiments on lab
animals, Owens-Corning received a discouraging letter from the lab that had
performed the tests. The lab's initial clean bill-of-health finding was
premature, and in fact the animals had developed asbestosis as more time
elapsed. In conclusion the lab wrote to the company: "I realize that our findings regarding Kaylo are less
favorable than anticipated. However, since Kaylo is capable of producing
asbestosis, it is better to discover it now in animals rather than later in
industrial workers. Thus the company, being forewarned, will be in a better
position to institute adequate control measures for safe-guarding exposed
employees and protecting its own interests." — 1948
Owens-Corning memo [View
document] Yet,
decades later in 1970, intra-company correspondence shows that Owens-Corning
was still reluctant to properly label the product to indicate health hazards
from asbestos: "...regarding the warning label that should appear on
Kaylo. Are you saying that we have to do this now? I naturally would like to
delay this requirement as long as possible." —
1970 Owens-Corning memo [View
document] A
March 30, 1977 memo from a W.R. Grace health and safety official advised
against conducting further study of asbestos-diseased workers out of concern
that the information would become public: "I believe that the results of a study of this nature
would become public knowledge within a relatively short period of time
regardless of confidentiality agreements. If we are not prepared to deal with
that situation, I would advise against proceeding." —
1977 W.R. Grace memo [View
document] Keeping
information from consumers
Companies
with significant asbestos sales used extreme measures to keep their customers
in the dark about the risks of using asbestos products. The intimidation
tactics and reassuring messages used by these companies no doubt led to
complacency about asbestos hazards on the part of consumers, contributing to
the incidence of clearly avoidable asbestos diseases now emerging among the
general public. In a
1970 W.R. Grace memo regarding sales of its Mono-Kote fire-proofing spray
product, which contained twelve percent asbestos, an employee urged: "Stay unscrupulous, unethical, mean and selling
Mono-Kote." According
to a New York Times investigation of Grace's Monokote product, the company
continued selling "re-formulated" Monokote until the late 1980s,
labeling it "asbestos-free" despite its knowledge that the product
still contained up to 1 percent asbestos. Grace management instructed employees
that inquiring customers were to be told the product did not contain any asbestos.
Due to Grace's "asbestos free" claim, workers using Monokote stopped
wearing protective respirators, believing the reformulated product was safe
[The A
1972 Union Carbide memorandum instructed managers to handle inquiries from
concerned customers aggressively: "If the customer is persistent and threatens to
eliminate asbestos — a certain amount of aggressiveness may be effective. Words
and catch phrases such as "premature", "irrational" or
"avoiding the inevitable" will sometimes turn the table. The main
objective is to keep the customer on the defensive, make him justify his
position." —
1972 Union Carbide memo [View
document] A
year later, Union Carbide management instructed its sales personnel that
customers should be told "asbestos is not a carcinogen." [View
document] In
1973, Union Carbide's own medical department advised the company to stop
belittling the dangers of asbestos exposure in marketing literature for
asbestos products, noting several "misleading" and "half
truth" statements in the company's literature. Company doctors referenced
government studies indicating asbestos exposures "as short as one
day" had produced lung disease, contrary to the company's assertion that
"massive long term exposure to asbestos" was required to produce
asbestos diseases. [View
document] Manipulating
the media
As
word began to trickle out to the mainstream media about the appalling hazards
of asbestos, controlling information flow and manipulating the media became a
top priority for the industry. In June 1973, at a meeting of the Asbestos
Textile Institute, asbestos industry representatives predicted the deaths of
tens of thousands of employees from asbestos disease, and then noted that
"the good news" was that the public was still vastly unaware of the
problem. The
meeting's guest speaker, an executive from the Asbestos Information
Association, began his presentation by laying out the facts: "First, there is no doubt that the inhalation of
substantial amounts of asbestos can lead to increased rates of various types of
lung disease, including two forms of cancer. These are facts which cannot be
denied, even if they do not apply in all circumstances and under all
conditions. The medical literature is full of solid evidence linking asbestos
to disease. In my office, I have on file more than 2,000 medical papers dealing
with the health risks of asbestos and hundreds more are published every
year." —
1973 Asbestos Textile Institute memo The
presenter plainly stated that insulation workers "were and still are dying
from asbestos disease at an appalling rate." [View
document] Figures
were put forward about what the industry expected to happen to its workers: "Our prediction is that approximately 25,000 past and
present employees in the asbestos industry have died or will eventually die of
asbestos-related disease." —
1973 Asbestos Textile Institute memo Then
came the "good news:" "And the good news is that despite all the negative
articles on asbestos-health that have appeared in the press over the past
half-dozen years, very few people have been paying attention." —
1973 Asbestos Textile Institute memo Finally,
the guest speaker laid out his thoughts about media coverage of asbestos
issues: "The press relations battle will therefore be won, not
when the media starts to print positive or balanced articles about asbestos,
but when the press ceases to print anything about asbestos at all. As long as
negative news on asbestos-health continues to be generated, the media will
continue to eat it up. The media will only cease to carry such stories when the
generation of negative news ceases. It is as simple as that. Positive or
balanced stories are a chimera, since they are, by definition, not
newsworthy." —
1973 Asbestos Textile Institute memo Anticipating
a government investigation into its widespread knowledge of the dangers of
asbestos, the industry worried internally and began to ready its defenses. A
1981 Dow internal memo marked "CONFIDENTIAL" had the following note
scrawled across the top by a worried executive: "We are in trouble and would be more so if we had an
investigation. We need a crash program." —
1981 Dow confidential memo [View
Document] REFERENCES
1.
Bowker, Michael. (2003). Fatal Deception: The
Terrifying True Story of How Asbestos Is Killing 2.
Brodeur, Paul. (1985). Outrageous Misconduct: The
Asbestos Industry On Trial, Pantheon Books, 3.
Hoffman, F. (1918). "Mortality from
Respiratory Diseases in Dust Trades." 4.
The New York Times. (7/9/01). "PROTECTING THE
PRODUCT: A special report; Company's Silence Countered Safety Fears About
Asbestos" By Michael Moss and Adrianne Appel. 5.
Michelbacher, G.F. (1942). Casualty Insurance
Principles. McGraw-Hill Books, Millions
Were Exposed — Were You?  "Take
home" exposure
Not
all of the victims of asbestos are workers, particularly for mesothelioma, the
signature and 100 percent fatal asbestos cancer. People hurt or killed by
asbestos include the families of the men and women who work with asbestos, the
communities that surround current and former asbestos mines, products factories
and shipyards, and consumers who innocently exposed themselves and family
members to asbestos through products like hair dryers, electric blankets, attic
insulation, home siding and ceiling and floor tiles and many more. Fatal
mesothelioma in the families of asbestos workers is the most well-described and
prevalent form of non-occupational asbestos mortality. Mesothelioma is unique
among asbestos cancers in that it can be caused by very short-term exposures.
In approximately three percent of cases, mesothelioma is diagnosed in workers
with less than three months exposure; the shortest on record is 16 hours (Leigh
2003). A laboratory animal study published in 1974 also reported that a single
high level exposure to at least one type of asbestos, amosite, may be enough to
cause mesothelioma in rats (Wagner 1974). One review describes mesothelioma in
a person who reported his total lifetime asbestos exposure as one day of sawing
up asbestos cement sheets to build two sheds (Greenberg, 1974). For
profiles of mesothelioma victims see The
Mesothelioma Applied Research Foundation. A
1967 summary of 42 mesothelioma cases reported by 152 hospitals in southeastern
An
EWG Action Fund analysis of government asbestos mortality data for mesothelioma
found that from 1985 through 1999, "non-paid worker at own home" was
the top ranked business classification on death certificates for mesothelioma.
Presumably most of these cases were housewives and family members who died from
mesothelioma after they were exposed to asbestos brought home by a parent,
spouse, or family member who worked with it. Hundreds
of housewives and family members were killed by "take home" asbestos
exposures
Source:
EWG Action Fund. Compiled from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), A
business classification was assigned to just 3,603 of the 14,500 people who
were estimated or reported to have died of mesothelioma between 1985 and 2001.
If these 3,603 deaths represent the distribution of mesothelioma deaths across
businesses represented by all 14,500 cases, then it would appear that about one
quarter of all mesothelioma mortality occurs in people who did not work
directly with asbestos, but instead worked in environments where asbestos was
present, or lived with people who brought asbestos home with them. A
small number of family members of asbestos workers have successfully pursued
compensation through the courts. Of the 107,000 client records received by EWG
Action Fund from plaintiffs' attorneys, 882 individuals were exposed at home.
Of this number, which accounts for less than one percent of total victims
represented, 56 developed lung cancer, 77 developed mesothelioma, 672 developed
asbestosis, and 77 had other diagnoses. Passive
workplace exposure — schools and hospitals
The
same EWG Action Fund analysis of federal mortality data found that five of the
ten most commonly recorded industries on death certificates do not have any
well-established connection to occupational asbestos exposure. These cases are
either due to passive asbestos exposure in the work environment, as with the
teachers described above, or because of relatively brief occupational exposures
decades ago. Death certificates do not reflect a person's work history. It is
not uncommon for an office worker to contract mesothelioma, and only upon
detailed questioning recall that decades earlier he or she worked around
asbestos in some short-term employment. Older
public buildings where asbestos may be decaying and slowly drifting into indoor
air is another major concern. The EPA estimated in 1982 that more than 720,000
public buildings had significant amounts of asbestos in them. Leaving aging
asbestos in place is no guarantee of safety, and removing it can be highly
dangerous if not done carefully. There is substantial evidence that much
asbestos removal does not meet federal standards. Links: County:
Laborers
Face A Lifetime Of Health Worries Father
and Son Faked Removal of Asbestos, Workers Say One
key at-risk group is schoolteachers, who may have received significant exposure
to asbestos from soundproofing and fireproofing of ceilings and walls.
'Elementary school teacher' was the eighth most frequently listed occupation on
mesothelioma death certificates (NCHS, 2003). Elementary and secondary schools
ranked third among all businesses reporting mesothelioma cases. Hospitals
ranked fourth. In the late 1970s, it was estimated that two to six million
school children and 100,000 to 300,000 teachers had been exposed to asbestos in
schools (Nicholson, 1979). A 1991 review describes four teachers with fatal
mesothelioma, "...who worked in schools that were insulated with asbestos
and who had no other known exposure to this mineral" (Lilienfeld 1991). A
mesothelioma case report published in the journal Respiratory Medicine in 1989
describes a 54-year old woman whose only identifiable asbestos exposure
occurred in the office. As explained by the study authors, the ceilings in the
building where she worked for 14 years "were sprayed with an inch thick
layer of soft asbestos covered by a layer of paint. This evidently deteriorated
rapidly, since as a result of complaints about dust in the offices, the
ceilings were sealed, repaired and repainted about eight years after the
building was constructed" (Stein 1989). In
1980, the Consumer Products Safety Commission removed similar asbestos ceiling
material from its headquarters in "CPSC believes that any exposure to asbestos may
involve some increase of risk; no safe level of exposure or so-called
"threshold level" has been established. It is impossible to estimate
with any precision the exact degree of risk associated with any low-level
exposures." [www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PREREL/prhtml80/80024.html] Neighborhood
exposure
Living
near asbestos products factories can be as dangerous as having family members
who work at the plant. A 1967 summary of 42 mesothelioma cases in southeastern In
Libby, Montana, the site of the notorious W.R. Grace vermiculite mine, entire
families have been diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases, when just one
family member, usually the father, worked at the mine and brought home asbestos
dust on his clothes. Children in Libby have developed mesothelioma and
asbestosis as adults from playing in vermiculite slag heaps scattered through
the town. The
federal government has identified 28 former asbestos manufacturing sites as
priority locations for community-wide evaluations of asbestos disease because
these sites received approximately 80 percent of the asbestos in Libby from
1964 through 1990 [View
maps]. EPA estimates that 30 million homes have asbestos (vermiculite) attic
insulation made at processing plants all across the country. Federal
officials have expressed serious concern about the risks for community
residents living near these facilities. "It's like a ticking time bomb
inside your chest," said an official with the federal Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry describing a priority vermiculite processing
site in Beltsville, Maryland (Washington Post 10/3/03). Madelene Audia, who
lives about 150 yards from a former vermiculite plant in In
1997, Dr. Michael Berry, a scientist at the New Jersey Department of Health and
Senior Services, published a study that investigated mesothelioma incidence in
people who lived in the same town (Manville, NJ) or county (Somerset) as the
largest asbestos manufacturing plant in North America (Berry, 1997). When plant
employees were removed from the analysis, male and female residents of Manville
were 10.1 and 22.4 times more likely to develop mesothelioma than residents of
Consumer
product exposure
Tens
of millions of people were exposed to asbestos through hundreds of common
consumer products including hair dryers, electric blankets, heat guns, molding
clay, dry wall patch, attic insulation, pipe wrap insulation, fake fireplace
logs and many more. Some of these products were banned by the Consumer Products
Safety Commission (CPSC). Many were not. The most notorious asbestos product
that was never banned by the CPSC is vermiculite (asbestos) attic insulation,
from the vermiculite mine in Consumer
products containing asbestos present grave and lingering risks to the millions
of people who used them, but in general had no idea they were being exposed to
cancer causing asbestos in the process. In 1979, the Consumer Products Safety
Commission characterized the risk this way: Although worker exposure to asbestos fibers on the job is
regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), CPSC
believes that asbestos fibers released from consumer products may pose unique
problems in households. The household environment may harbor these fibers for
long periods, and they may be repeatedly stirred up into the air after having
settled to a surface. Infants and children in the home are likely to be
exposed, and this environment, unlike the workplace, is not equipped with
protective clothing or control systems for asbestos fibers. (CPSC
8/31/79 Commission To Study Asbestos In Consumer Products) Asbestos
in blow dryers
Perhaps
no consumer product better symbolizes the 1970s than the hand-held blow dryer.
As it turns out, these hair dryers were not only puffing coifs, but also
hurling asbestos fibers into the indoor environment. This extraordinary hazard
was discovered entirely by accident, when a photographer using a blow dryer to
dry negatives noticed tiny flecks of dust on his negatives. The revelation that
this "dust" was actually asbestos led the CPSC to pressure
manufacturers to voluntarily stop using asbestos in all hair dryers, though it
was never officially banned. CPSC described the risk at the time as less than
"many" occupational asbestos exposures, but by implication,
presumably greater than others: "While the risk to an individual from the intermittent
use of an asbestos-emitting hair dryer is less than that from many current
occupational asbestos exposures, the large number of individuals that may be
exposed clearly calls for the elimination of the exposure." [www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PREREL/prhtml79/79062.html] An
incredible array of products brought asbestos into the home in the not so
distant past. Links to CPSC announcements of bans on selected
asbestos-containing consumer products are listed below, followed by a partial
list of asbestos-containing consumer products as of about 1980. Crayons Hair
Dryers Heat
Guns (used by model airplane hobbyists) Paper
Mache Artificial
Fireplace Ash Consumer
Patching Compounds Asbestos
paper (used primarily to insulate ducts and pipes) Other
products: ·
Broilers ·
Barbecue fire starters (electric) ·
Deep Fryers ·
Frying pans and grills (electric) ·
Mixers (electric) ·
Popcorn poppers ·
Ranges and ovens ·
Slow cookers ·
Toaster ·
Clothes washers and dryers ·
Dishwashers ·
Refrigerators ·
Curling irons (electric) ·
Electric blankets ·
Heaters, portable electric ·
Texture paint ·
Asbestos paper (including asbestos paper tape) and
millboard (i.e., in rolls or sheets) for consumer use, including but not
limited to such uses as (This category does not include paper and millboard
sold as a component of another product). ·
Wall protection behind heat-generating products ·
Floor protection under wood and coal stoves ·
Soldering and welding blocks or sheets ·
Pipe insulation ·
Airduct insulation ·
High-temperature wallboard ·
Iron rests and burner mats; barbecue mitts, pot
holders and similar items ·
High-temperature gaskets for wood and coal stoves
(including fireplace inserts) ·
Stovepipe rings ·
Safes, Kilns, safety boxes, filing cabinets, and
incinerators (All
from www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PREREL/prhtml80/80021.html) Asbestos
is still not banned
Although
the CPSC took action against the use of asbestos in many consumer products,
asbestos is still not banned and is still used widely for certain applications.
The 2001 Mineral Commodity Summary for Asbestos from the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) reported 61% of the asbestos used in the United States (in 2000) was in
roofing products, 19% in friction products, 13% in gaskets, and 7% was
classified as 'other'. www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/hwtr/demodebris/pages2/demowasteother.html (EPA's main asbestos page
is: www.epa.gov/asbestos/) Even
today, almost none of the products containing asbestos are labeled as such.
This clearly makes it difficult for consumers to choose products that are
asbestos-free. According to the CPSC, as of May 2003: "The extent of current asbestos product labeling is
limited. Except for products which are sold unwrapped, such as millboard; and
asbestos-cement sheet, all products are labeled with the name of the
manufacturer or distributor. Only asbestos paper and furnace cement are labeled
as containing asbestos. Non-asbestos substitutes for all asbestos products are
widely available to the public for household uses." (CPSC
May 28, 2003, CANCER HAZARD! CPSC Warns About Asbestos in Consumer Products:
Safety Alert) www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/5080.html A
partial list of products that still contain asbestos can be found at: www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6pd/asbestos/asbmatl.htm It
is presented below as well. "Asbestos
Containing Materials: Sample List of Suspect Asbestos-Containing
Materials" ·
Cement Pipes ·
Elevator Brake Shoes ·
Cement Wallboard ·
HVAC Duct Insulation ·
Cement Siding ·
Boiler Insulation ·
Asphalt Floor Tile ·
Breaching Insulation ·
Vinyl Floor Tile ·
Ductwork Flexible Fabric Connections ·
Vinyl Sheet Flooring ·
Cooling Towers ·
Flooring Backing ·
Pipe Insulation (corrugated air-cell, block, etc.) ·
Construction Mastics (floor tile, carpet, ceiling
tile, etc.) ·
Heating and Electrical Ducts ·
Acoustical Plaster ·
Electrical Panel Partitions ·
Decorative Plaster ·
Electrical Cloth ·
Textured Paints/Coatings ·
Electric Wiring Insulation ·
Ceiling Tiles and Lay-in Panels ·
Chalkboards ·
Spray-Applied Insulation ·
Roofing Shingles ·
Blown-in Insulation ·
Roofing Felt ·
Fireproofing Materials ·
Base Flashing ·
Taping Compounds (thermal) ·
Thermal Paper Products ·
Packing Materials (for wall/floor penetrations) ·
Fire Doors ·
High Temperature Gaskets ·
Caulking/Putties ·
Laboratory Hoods/Table Tops ·
Adhesives ·
Laboratory Gloves ·
Wallboard ·
Fire Blankets ·
Joint Compounds ·
Fire Curtains ·
Vinyl Wall Coverings ·
Elevator Equipment Panels ·
Spackling Compounds (Source:
www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6pd/asbestos/asbmatl.htm) REFERENCES
1.
Berry, M. (1997). "Mesothelioma incidence and
community asbestos exposure." Environ Res 75(1): 34-40. 2.
3.
Greenberg, M. and T. A. Davies (1974).
"Mesothelioma register 1967-68." Br J 4.
Lieben, J. and H. Pistawka (1967).
"Mesothelioma and asbestos exposure." Arch Environ Health 14(4):
559-63. 5.
6.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) (2002). "Work-related lung disease surveillance
report." Division of Respiratory Disease Studies. 7.
Nicholson, W. J., E. J. Swoszowski, Jr., et al.
(1979). "Asbestos contamination in 8.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(2004). "Safety and Health Topics: Asbestos." Viewable on the web at:
www.osha.gov/SLTC/asbestos/index.html
9.
Stein, R.C., J.Y. Kitajewska, et al. (1989).
"Pleural mesothelioma resulting from exposure to amosite asbestos in a
building." Journal of Respiratory Medicine 83: 237-39. 10.
The Section 5: The
Failed EPA Asbestos Ban Asbestos
manufacturing and sale of asbestos-containing goods is still legal in the
Although
public health professionals had long been aware of the deaths and illnesses
related to asbestos exposure, it wasn't until the early 1970s that asbestos
garnered the attention of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As the agencies began to
take note of existing and developing science and epidemiology regarding
asbestos-related health hazards, they started to issue safety standards and
regulations of the dangerous fiber. In 1971, EPA promulgated an emissions
standard under the Clean Air Act. A year later, OSHA put forth an occupational
standard, which got progressively more protective over the course of the
decade.
EPA
and OSHA regulations of asbestos remained limited in their reach when EPA
decided in 1979 to issue a notice of its intent to regulate asbestos under the
authority of Section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Because an
absolute ban is possible under TSCA, the potential for a ban became imminent,
and asbestos producers and the Canadian government began to pressure the Reagan
Administration's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to halt EPA's efforts. In
1989, after conducting a ten year study, spending ten million dollars, and
accumulating a 100,000 page administrative record, EPA announced that it would
phase out and ban virtually all products containing asbestos. (54 Fed. Reg.
29,460 (1989); Stadler, 1993, at 423). The ban applied to the manufacture,
import, processing and distribution of asbestos products. It would affect 94%
of all asbestos consumption, including a ban of asbestos-containing products like
brake linings, roofing, pipes, tile, and insulation. EPA's stated rationale for
the ban was simple: "asbestos is a human carcinogen and is one of the most
hazardous substances to which humans are exposed in both occupational and
non-occupational settings." (54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, at 29,468 (1989)). An
apparent victory in the nearly 20-year struggle to protect the public from
asbestos exposure, and promising use of TSCA as a tool to protect public
health, the EPA ban would ultimately fail to overcome the vigorous campaign to
perpetuate the use of asbestos. From
the outset, the measure met with fierce opposition. Citing job loss and
potential economic ruin, asbestos industry supporters referred to the ban as
"death by regulation." Asbestos product manufacturers and industry
organizations swiftly filed a lawsuit challenging the ban's validity under TSCA
in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA. They sought to overturn the ban, claiming
that it was too costly and that the alternatives were neither more effective nor
safer than asbestos. The Canadian Federal Government and the In a
seminal decision, the Fifth Circuit vacated the ban, finding that EPA failed to
present "substantial evidence" to justify the ban under TSCA. Despite
its acknowledgment that "asbestos is a potential carcinogen at all levels
of exposure," the court attacked the EPA's action on several fronts. The
court determined that the agency's administrative record failed to demonstrate
that the ruling was the "least burdensome alternative" for
eliminating the "unreasonable risk" of exposure to asbestos, as
required by TSCA. The court questioned EPA's analysis of product substitutes,
finding that the proposed substitutes were unavailable or potentially harmful
(Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, at 1220). The court also rejected EPA's cost/benefit
analysis, challenging EPA's consideration of "unquantifiable
benefits," and dismissing EPA's determination with respect to the presence
of unreasonable risk (18 Am. L. J. and Med. 395). The
Fifth Circuit's decision has been called a "tragedy for the EPA," for
it is seen as having "place[d] seemingly impossible analytical
requirements on [government] agencies." (Stadler, 1993, at 433; Percival,
1997, at 521). Scholars note that the ruling in "Corrosion Proof Fittings
reaches beyond asbestos regulation, restricting the EPA's ability to regulate
the use of any toxic substance under TSCA." The holding indeed poses a
serious question: If EPA can't ban a known carcinogen, at which no level of
exposure is safe, how can EPA regulate any toxic substance? Even
more disturbing than the Fifth Circuit ruling was the decision by the first
Bush Administration not to appeal the case. After ten years of research and
deliberation, millions of dollars poured into the regulation, and countless
hours of work by environmental health officials, the asbestos ban was
completely abandoned. The ruling left room for EPA to reconcile its research in
accordance with the court's reasoning, but no further action was pursued. EPA
did not persist in its decision to eliminate the "unreasonable risk"
posed by asbestos. Instead, the public was left to bear the burden. Products
containing asbestos are still sold and manufactured in the References
·
Final Rule: Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, and
Distributions in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,450 (1989)(to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763) ·
Linda Stadler, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA:
Asbestos in the Fifth Circuit—A ·
Corrosion Proof Fittings, et al. v. The
Environmental Protection Agency and William K. Reilly, Administrator, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991). ·
EPA to Shift Responsibility to OSHA, CPSC; Plans to
Refer Other Chemical Regulations, 13 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No.
29, at 73 (July 19, 1985). ·
Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in
Environmental Regulation, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 943, 952-54 (1994). ·
Section 6: Tiny
Amounts are Deadly  [Excerpt
| Full
document]
No
one is in favor of compensating individuals for a disease or injury they do not
have. But asbestos diseases, particularly the early stages of asbestosis, do
not lend themselves to a simple diagnosis. For asbestosis, which is progressive
and in many cases fatal, the absence of observable physical impairment by X-ray
or other measures is no guarantee that the disease is not present and that
significant damage has not already occurred. A person may have lost more than
25 percent of their lung capacity due to scarring from asbestos and have no
observable damage at all. Diagnosing
early stage asbestosis is a multifaceted procedure. Specialized reading of
X-ray results is just one of five components of a complete diagnosis that
typically involves an evaluation of pulmonary function, documentation of a
history of asbestos exposure, shortness of breath, and clubbing of fingers. The
original X-ray reading system for workers exposed to asbestos was devised by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and involved four
different specialists, called B readers, reading and classifying X-rays
independently. The outlier result, most often the most severe classification,
was then discarded, and the classification for the individual was derived as
the average of the remaining three ratings. A diagnosis was not considered
complete, however, until a full evaluation, including all the components listed
above, was performed. Today's
"unimpaired" asbestos worker could easily be tomorrow's mortality
statistic. Any asbestos compensation fund set up by the Congress must account
for this medical fact and not deny, delay, or complicate future assistance
based on current lack of impairment. Policies
to protect potential asbestos victims must be flexible and inclusive because: ·
Bodily injury begins with the first inhalation of
asbestos fibers, yet lung damage from asbestos cannot be detected by X-ray
until an estimated 30 percent of lung capacity has been lost. Inability to
detect damage via X-ray does not mean that a person does not have the disease. ·
Asbestosis is a progressive disease. Twenty-eight
(28) to 38 percent of persons with the disease progress to a more severe
classification within 2 to 10 years (Markowitz 1997). ·
People with early stage asbestosis, many of whom
would be classified as unimpaired in the proposed Senate legislation, are at
substantial risk for lung cancer or mesothelioma. In the definitive study of
asbestos insulation workers, 30 percent of workers with no X-ray evidence of
lung damage (a zero classification on the ILO system) died of mesothelioma or
lung cancer within 27 years of the initial diagnosis. Those with "minimal
X-ray change" fared even worse. Nearly 40 percent (39.9 percent) of
individuals initially diagnosed as ILO classification 1, died of these two
cancers within the 27 years analyzed. [View
document] If
unimpaired people are in fact being compensated, the compassionate response is
to upgrade the quality of diagnoses, not to deny compensation to entire
categories of individuals based solely on X-ray classifications. But
in fact it is not at all clear that so-called "unimpaired" people are
having any significant impact on compensation. David Austern, General Counsel
for the Manville Trust, estimates that between two thirds and three quarters of
the 200,000 non-cancer claims brought before the Trust were legitimate Level II
cases, a clearly impaired asbestosis diagnosis [View
document]. An analysis of insurance industry data on compensation awarded
under the Babcock and Wilcox asbestos trust found that 70 percent of claims
qualified as substantial impairment or greater (Peterson 2003b). The rest were
simply not paid. Perhaps
a more serious concern is that very few asbestos workers ever step forward and
seek any compensation at all. Most die with or from their disabilities and
diseases, leaving their families bearing the brunt of medical costs as well as
the emotional strain of a prolonged and preventable illness. A great number of
experts, particularly those not employed by defendant companies, feel that
misdiagnoses of asbestosis cases are a significant source of underreporting
bias (Markowitz 1997). Many, and perhaps even the majority, of workers with
asbestosis are misdiagnosed with emphysema or other respiratory ailments. Between
1940 and 1979, an estimated 27.5 million workers were exposed to asbestos at
work, and in 18.8 million workers exposure levels would be considered high
(Nicholson 1982). Millions more have been exposed since then. For some jobs,
asbestos levels would routinely exceed the current OSHA guidelines by 200 to
400 times (Welch 2003). An extremely high percentage of workers in
asbestos-exposed occupations will develop some form of asbestos-related disease.
A 1980 estimate of potential asbestos claims by the American Insurance
Association (AIA) noted that "lung cancer deaths occur in approximately
20-25 percent of all deaths of asbestos workers, and mesothelioma deaths in
7-10 percent of all deaths of asbestos workers..." [Excerpt
| Full
document ]. This same document estimated that 25 to 33 percent of potential
claims from exposed workers in 14 industries would be based on asbestosis. [Excerpt
| Full
document ] Worker
monitoring confirms these projections. Thirty-eight percent of pipe insulators
in ship construction develop asbestosis 20 years after first exposure
(Department of Health and Human Services 1978); 27 percent of asbestos exposed
construction workers had radiographic evidence of asbestosis (Kilburn 2000).
Although today's workers breathe less asbestos than workers prior to 1980, it
is exposures 20 and 30 years ago that are producing casualties today. Just
730,000, or 2.5 percent, of the 27.5 million workers exposed on the job to
asbestos through 1978, have filed suit for compensation. Deterioration
from a diagnosis of "unimpaired" to death can be relatively rapid,
even for non-cancer outcomes. Almost one in a hundred (0.9%) North American
insulators with normal baseline X-rays [International Labor Office (ILO)
Category 0] followed for ten years died due to asbestosis (Markowitz 1997).
Insulation workers in ILO
category 1, the least severe asbestosis classification, have a 2.4 percent
risk of dying from the disease within ten years (Markowitz 1997). People
at these early stages typically do not have any evidence of a functional
impairment, meaning that they do not experience symptoms such as shortness of
breath, coughing, chest pain and tightness. Only later, when the disease has
progressed to the point of reducing lung capacity by more than 30 percent do
people begin to notice symptoms. Once
a diagnosis has been made, asbestosis typically progresses to increasingly
serious stages. In what has become a classic memo, Dr. Kenneth Smith, the
medical director at Johns Manville stated, "The fibrosis of this disease
is irreversible and permanent..." (Brodeur 1985, pg. 102). Estimates
from a Finnish cohort of asbestosis cases found that the disease progressed to
a more severe form in 28 to 38 percent of patients during a two to ten year
follow-up (Oksa 1998). Selikoff's classic study of insulation workers shows
that the number of asbestos insulation workers with ILO
categories 2 and 3 greatly increased in the decades following first
exposure, reaching 65 percent after 40 years (Selikoff 1976). Asbestosis
is a Progressive Disease
(Modified
from Selikoff, 1976, as cited in Walker, 1983). If
asbestosis becomes severe, classified in ILO category 3, 35 percent of
insulation workers will die from the disease within ten years (Markowitz 1997).
One third of workers with advanced asbestosis (ILO categories 2 and 3) will die
of lung cancer (Selikoff 1990). Additional
research links asbestosis progression with lung cancer. In a ten-year Finnish
study, risk of lung cancer increased dramatically if asbestosis progressed
during the period analyzed; approximately 46 percent of progressors developed
lung cancer compared to nine percent of patients whose asbestosis did not
progress. All lung cancer cases were current or former smokers (Oksa 1998b).
According to an insurance industry association (AIA) review, approximately 50
percent of patients diagnosed with asbestosis will die of or with lung cancer.
[Excerpt
| Full
document] More
than one third of asbestos insulation workers diagnosed as "unimpaired"
died from asbestos disease within 27 years. (Selikoff 1990).
Asbestos
industry and insurance experts readily acknowledge in court proceedings that
asbestos fibers begin causing tissue or cellular damage shortly after asbestos
fibers are first deposited in the lung and that the disease is progressive and
irreversible. These experts also agree that the disease is typically diagnosed
only in the advanced stages. "The undisputed medical facts [are that] ... [a]ctual
bodily injury, in the form of tissue or cellular damage caused by lodged
asbestos fibers, begins shortly after such fibers are first inhaled."
(Source: Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, 1984, at 8.) "injury and the onset of fibrosis occur soon after the
initial deposition of asbestos fibers in the lung ...is supported by the
overwhelming weight of the medical evidence."
(Source: Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 1987, at 21.) "The only conclusion that can be drawn from the medical
evidence is the conclusion that is virtually uniform in the medical literature
— asbestos-related injuries are the result of a continuous injurious process,
beginning with first exposure and continuing through clinical
manifestation."
(Source: Post-Trial Phase III Brief of Policy Holders on the
Medical Evidence, 1986, at 8.) "Moreover, that injury occurs continuously from the
first day of occupational exposure through clinical diagnosis whether or not
there has been an intervening period of no exposure"
(Source: Post-Trial Phase III Brief of Policy Holders on the
Medical Evidence, 1986, at 20.) "The first injury leading to the development of
bronchogenic carcinoma or mesothelioma ... is the inflammatory reaction and
onset of fibrosis which occur at the time of initial exposure."
(Source: Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 1987, at 41.) "Once the gas exchange capacity of an individual
alveolar/capillary unit is compromised, the loss is permanent."
(Source: Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 1987, at 10.) "The accumulation of scar-like tissue decreases the
functional volume of the lungs, stiffens the passage ways, and impedes the
transfer of gases in and out of the blood. If the process continues, the
functional capacity of the lungs becomes inadequate to support normal
activities and may eventually be unable to support life."
(Source: Brief of The Travelers Insurance Co., 1981.) [View
document] "The injury to the body begins at the first inhalation
of the asbestos fibers. Although the eventual change in the lungs begins to
develop at this time, it is not until the disease is relatively advanced that a
firm diagnosis of asbestosis can be made."
(Source: Internal Memo of The Travelers Ins. Co., Liability
Claims Administration, Section 18, Injurious Exposure Claims, at sec. 18.1.) "It is estimated that in order for the disease
asbestosis to be clinically diagnosed, the gas exchange function of at least
100 million alveolar/capillary units [1/3 of the lung] must be affected."
(Source: Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 1987, at 12.) Endnotes
Statements
of Pittsburgh Corning Corporation in Internal
Memo of The Travelers Ins. Co., Liability Claims Administration, Section 18,
Injurious Exposure Claims, at sec. 18.1. Armstrong
World Industries, Inc., Fibreboard Corporation and GAF Corporation Statements,
Policyholders' Proposed Medical Findings of Fact, In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage
Cases, Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, Dep't
No. Nine, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, January 26, 1987. Post-Trial
Phase III Brief of Policy Holders on the Medical Evidence, Superior Court of
the State of Ca., City & County of San Francisco, Dept. No. 9, Judicial
Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, Filed Dec. 9, 1986. Brief
of The Travelers Insurance Co. re Exposure v. Manifestation, Commercial Union
Inc. Brodeur,
Paul. (1985). Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry On Trial, Pantheon
Books, Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) (1978). "Asbestos: An information
resource [Cited in: American Insurance Association, Estimates of potential
liability from asbestos and DES related injury (draft preliminary report).
Presented to the task force on tort liability for cumulative trauma and latent
injury, 1980]." Kilburn,
K. H. (2000). "Prevalence and features of advanced asbestosis (ILO
profusion scores above 2/2). International Labour Office." Arch Environ
Health 55(2): 104-8. Markowitz,
S. B., A. Morabia, et al. (1997). "Clinical predictors of mortality from
asbestosis in the North American Insulator Cohort, 1981 to 1991." Am J
Respir Crit Care Med 156(1): 101-8. Nicholson,
W. J., G. Perkel, et al. (1982). "Occupational exposure to asbestos:
population at risk and projected mortality--1980-2030." Am J Oksa,
P., M. S. Huuskonen, et al. (1998). "Follow-up of asbestosis patients and
predictors for radiographic progression." Int Arch Occup Environ Health
71(7): 465-71. Oksa,
P., M. Klockars, et al. (1998b). "Progression of asbestosis predicts lung
cancer." Chest 113(6): 1517-21. Peterson,
M. A. (2003). "Testimony at the Peterson,
M. A. (2003b). "Forecasting the Costs of S.1125 As Amended on July 10,
2003." Prepared for Caplin and Drysdale, September 8, 2003. Selikoff,
Selikoff,
M.D., I.J, R. Lilis, M.D., and H. Seidman, M.B.A., Predictive Significance of
Parenchymal and/or Pleural Fibrosis for Subsequent Death of Asbestos-Associated
Diseases, (unpublished manuscript). Walker,
A. M., J. E. Loughlin, et al. (1983). "Projections of asbestos-related
disease 1980-2009." J Occup Med 25(5): 409-25. Welch,
L. S. (2003). "Testimony at the ILO
Categories Explained
Testimony
of Laura Welch, MD Medical
Criteria, Populations at Risk and Disease Projections Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee June 4, 2003 Excerpt,
page 3: The
International Labor Organization developed a way of grading chest x-rays for
dust diseases of the lung. The most recent version is the1980 Classification of
the Radiographic Appearance of Pneumoconioses (dust diseases of the lung). This
system is accepted around the world. It provides a standard notation, so that
if one reader calls a film a "1/1" another reader will know what the
first reader is referring to. The classification uses a 12-point scale to
define the degree, or severity, of increased lung markings. Classification of
pleural changes (involvement of the membrane lining the chest wall and the
lung) uses a separate scale, with specific notations made for side of the
chest, whether or not the plaques contain calcium deposits, and the specific
type, length, and width of the thickening of the pleura. This
12-point scale runs from 0/- to 3/+; a "0" film is normal and a
"3" film is the most severe scarring. Each reading on the scale is
characterized by a number between 0 and 3, and a second number, separated by
"/". The first number, preceding the "/", is the final
number assigned to that film by that reader. The second number, following the
"/", is a qualifier. The numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3 are the main
categories. An x-ray read as a category 1 film might be described as 1/0, 1/1,
or 1/ 2. When the reader uses 1/1, he is rating the film as a 1, and only
considered it as a 1 film. If he uses 1/0, he is saying is rating the film as a
"1", but considered calling it a "0" film before deciding it
was category 1. Finally, when the reader uses 1/2, he is saying he is rating
the film as a "1", but did consider calling it a "2" film.
In clinical practice, any category "1" film is abnormal; therefore a
1/0 film is consistent with asbestosis. Asbestos
isn’t the only problem that DuPont must face!!! More
news on the expanding facts about TOXIC TEFLON Thursday,
March 31, 2005 http://www.cbc.ca/consumers/market/files/health/teflon/index.html
Could
everyday consumer products be introducing a chemical into our homes? Marketplace unravels a mystery with an
investigation into a Teflon chemical called PFOA. It's used in the production
of common consumer products; it takes years to break down – and it's showing up
in our blood. Yes,
PFOA is used to make the Teflon® FEP that is used to make CMP Plenum Cable.
Read this story. CBC MARKETPLACE: YOUR HEALTH » CONTAMINANTS
There's something in the air, and it may be coming from your carpet
It’s a puzzle that scientists around the world are trying to piece
together. How is a
chemical showing up everywhere? The clues reside in everyday consumer products:
carpeting, dental floss, a pair of men’s pants, a child’s watch. What do
they have in common? Could everyday consumer products have a secret life – that
could be harmful? Hot on the trail
of the mystery is Scott Mabury, an environmental chemist at the
'They acted like crazy cattle' The first clue in Scott Mabury’s investigation into stain repellents
used in consumer products takes us hundreds of kilometres away from his lab, to
In the late
1990s, cows on a farm there started dying inexplicably. First they developed
pink eye. And then they started acting strangely. “They acted like crazy
cattle,” recalls farmer Della Tennant. “You had to be careful when you got out
in the field with them, because they would chase you.” In the end, the
Tennants lost almost 300 cattle. “They died horrible deaths,” says Della. “It
was awful… it was the most terrifying thing I had ever seen.” What could be
the cause? The Tennants didn’t have to look further than a nearby creek. They
noticed frothy foam that Della says would sometimes rise six feet above the top
of the water. “The fish were dying. That’s when we started getting suspicious,”
she says.
The Tennants
were suspicious of a corporate giant located just over the hill from their
farm: DuPont, known for the brand name Teflon. The Tennants
sued DuPont. The case was settled out of court. The Tennant's
lawsuit paved the way for another case, a class action over contaminated
drinking water. DuPont settled again in that case. “We felt that
people needed to know what was in their water,” says Della. What was in the
water was the chemical at the heart of our investigation: high levels of
perfluorooctanoic acid, or PFOA. It's a chemical DuPont makes at its plant in Secret memos speak of birth defects and cancer
The lawsuits uncover another clue in the stain-repellent mystery: secret
internal DuPont memos that expose how dangerous PFOA can be. The documents
reveal that:
DuPont dumped the same chemical, PFOA, into a
landfill. It leached into a creek that the Tennants’ cattle drank from. “It
makes me really sad that a company as big and as well-known as Dupont could do
such a thing,” says Della. The mystery deepens when it's discovered that the
Teflon chemical PFOA isn’t just polluting the fields
around DuPont's NEXT: Chemical’s
reach extends to the Canadian Arctic   |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|